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Foreword 
A More Perfect Union? Democracy in the 
Age of Ballot Initiatives 
Tom Pryor*
During each election, Americans go to the polls to decide 
who will represent them in government. Increasingly, voters 
are also being asked to vote on ballot measures that directly 
enact policy or even amend state constitutions. In 2012, Ameri-
cans around the country voted on more than one hundred ballot 
measures that touched on issues ranging from smoking bans to 
property taxes to same-sex marriage. The increasing use of bal-
lot measures to enact policy raises serious questions. To what 
extent is direct democracy consistent with a constitutional re-
quirement of a republican form of government? Given evolving 
First Amendment jurisprudence, how should laws governing 
campaigning apply to ballot measures? Are voters capable of 
making informed choices on ballot measures, and how should 
judges interpret and understand those choices? Are there is-
sues that should not be left up to the voters? In short, is direct 
democracy consistent with our constitutional democracy?  
 
                                                                                 
*  Symposium Articles Editor, Volume 97, Minnesota Law Review. The 
author thanks Dean David Wippman and the University of Minnesota Law 
School for their incredible and consistent support of the Law Review and the 
symposium. The author also thanks Professors Herbert Kritzer, William 
McGeveran, and Elizabeth Beaumont for moderating the panels and lending 
their expertise and insight to the discussion. The symposium would not have 
been possible without the monumental efforts of the Board and Staff members 
of the Law Review, both in running the symposium and in producing the sym-
posium issue. The author would like to thank, in particular, Brittany Bakken, 
Brian Burke, and Paul Schneider for their help and guidance throughout the 
development of the symposium. The author extends special appreciation to 
Vice President Walter Mondale for generously donating his time and more im-
portantly wisdom to help design and shape the symposium. The Law Review is 
indebted to the wonderful panelists who flew in from across the nation and to 
Secretary of State Mark Ritchie who took time away from a busy schedule to 
speak on these important issues on a cold fall day in Minnesota. Finally, Edi-
tor-in-Chief Chris Schmitter was a constant source of helpful advice, judg-
ment, and encouragement throughout the entire process for which the author 
is sincerely grateful. Copyright © 2013 by Tom Pryor. 
  
1550 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:1549 
 
These questions were particularly relevant to Minnesotans 
in 2012. Voters there were asked to decide on two ballot 
measures that would amend the state constitution. Amendment 
1 would have amended the constitution to define marriage as 
being only between one man and one woman and Amendment 2 
would have required voters to present valid photo identification 
to vote. After hotly contested campaigns, neither measure was 
passed. The Minnesota Law Review’s 2012 symposium, “A More 
Perfect Union? Democracy in the Age of Ballot Initiatives,” held 
on the eve of that election, was designed to advance public and 
scholarly discussion on the role that ballot measures play in a 
modern democracy. Panelists with diverse backgrounds and 
expertise came from across the nation to address the complex 
legal, political, and practical issues associated with legislating 
through the ballot. Instead of addressing the policy merits of 
any particular ballot measure, the discussion was focused on 
the institution of direct democracy as a whole.  
The first panel, titled “Citizens as Legislators,” explored 
voters’ role in direct democracy in contrast to representative 
democracy. The panelists discussed citizens’ obligations when 
voting directly on legislation; whether citizens are competent 
enough to meet those obligations; and whether and how judges 
should consider the citizenry’s intent when ruling on the consti-
tutionality of ballot measures. Professor Mathew McCubbins of 
USC presented findings on new empirical research that he and 
co-author Professor Craig Burnett conducted on voters’ behav-
ior regarding ballot measures. Social science research on voter 
competence raises doubts about voters’ ability to match their 
votes to the candidate that best represents their interests or 
values; in a sense, many voters may lack the information and 
skills to “vote correctly.” One of the most common defenses of 
candidate elections, however, is that partisanship operates as a 
useful heuristic or cue that helps voters vote correctly more of-
ten and more efficiently. Unfortunately, this important cue—
party labels—is missing in ballot measure campaigns.  
The conventional (if largely untested) wisdom is that en-
dorsements of ballot measures can operate as heuristic cues in 
much the same way that partisanship operates, allowing voters 
to cast votes for and against ballot measures with as much con-
fidence as if they understood the content of the measures them-
selves. To test the extent to which voters are capable of using 
endorsements as effective heuristics, Professors McCubbins 
and Burnett generated the largest dataset of survey responses 
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on this subject to date and used advanced statistical techniques 
to measure the relationship between being exposed to an en-
dorsement and voting correctly. They found that the effect of 
endorsements on voting behavior was highly conditional and 
inconsistent, raising doubts about the level of voter competency 
in direct democracy campaigns, especially on issues that are 
more technical in nature and that lack political saliency.  
Professor Ethan Leib of Fordham Law took a step back 
and, instead of asking what voters are capable of doing when 
voting on a ballot measure, asked what they are obligated to 
do. Professor Leib’s and his coauthor Michael Serota’s argu-
ment begins with the simple observation that the morally rele-
vant distinction between voting for a ballot measure and voting 
for a candidate is that the former directly enacts legislation 
that has the coercive force of law whereas the latter elects a 
representative who is tasked with the responsibility to draft 
and enact such legislation. Elected representatives are com-
monly believed to have a moral obligation to consider the public 
interest, and not just their private interests, when voting on 
legislation. By analogy, voters in direct democracy campaigns 
should observe similar moral duties. It may be morally permis-
sible to use self-interest as a driving motivation to vote for a 
candidate—such self-interested votes are, after all, filtered 
through the behavior of a representative who is obligated to 
uphold the public interest—but something more is required 
when voting on a ballot measure. Professor Leib argues that 
citizens casting votes in direct democracy contests, like elected 
representatives casting roll call votes, must make a sincere ef-
fort to vote in a way that would pursue the public interest.  
Professor Michael Gilbert, University of Virginia School of 
Law, concluded the first panel by analyzing whether and how 
judges should consider citizens’ intent when construing ballot 
measures. When dealing with ambiguous phrasing or a novel 
statutory question, it is not uncommon for judges to look to the 
legislative intent behind enacted legislation to help determine 
the proper application of the law. This task can be onerous as 
legislatures are made up of many scores of representatives, 
each with his or her own private motivations for voting for leg-
islation and each with his or her own individual understanding 
of what the resulting law does or should mean. When analyzing 
laws passed as ballot measures in which hundreds of thousands 
or even millions of voters cast votes, the task of determining 
voters’ intent appears almost impossible. Although the task ap-
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pears daunting at first glance, Professor Gilbert argues that de-
termining voters’ intent for ballot measures is actually possible 
in ways that discerning legislative intent is not. Professor Gil-
bert’s article analyzes judicial behavior to show that judges 
currently do consider voters’ intent when construing ballot ini-
tiatives and argues that, while this is a normatively positive 
endeavor, it comes with important tradeoffs as well.  
The second panel, “Ballot Campaigns: Politics as Usual?,” 
discussed in more depth the differences between ballot and 
candidate campaigns. Provost Elizabeth Garrett of USC has 
used the term “hybrid democracy” to describe America’s system 
of government because it combines elements of direct and rep-
resentative democracy. This poses pressing problems for our 
campaign finance and regulation regime: Do we need to worry 
about quid pro quo corruption in direct democracy campaigns, 
and if not, does government have any interest in regulating do-
nations to ballot measure campaigns? Do the issues raised dur-
ing ballot measure campaigns generate risks or harms that are 
distinct from candidate campaigns?  
Provost Garrett began the panel by pointing out that we 
live in a “hybrid democracy” not just because our elections fea-
ture elements of direct and representative democracy that op-
erate side-by-side, but because there is significant overlap be-
tween those two elements. Nowhere is this more evident than 
in recall elections. By analyzing two high profile gubernatorial 
recalls—the 2003 California recall of Governor Gray Davis and 
the 2012 Wisconsin attempted recall of Governor Scott Walk-
er—Provost Garrett demonstrates how direct democracy cam-
paigns to recall a candidate overlap in principle and in practice 
with candidate campaigns to reelect or replace the recalled offi-
cial. The financing laws that govern the two campaigns, howev-
er, are substantially different. Candidates and advocacy groups 
are able to raise significantly more money to fund campaigns 
that oppose or support a recall effort than they can for cam-
paigns to reelect or replace a specific candidate if and when the 
recall is successful. Provost Garrett persuasively argues that 
the same justifications for limits on candidate campaign dona-
tions should apply to many aspects of recall campaigns as well: 
if a large donation to a candidate’s election campaign raises the 
specter of quid pro quo corruption, for example, than a large 
donation to a candidate’s anti-recall campaign should be equal-
ly troubling.  
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Professor Michael Kang of Emory Law next raised related 
questions about disclosure laws. Government regulation of di-
rect democracy campaigns can be justified on several grounds. 
In addition to the government’s interest in preventing or miti-
gating the appearance of quid pro quo corruption, the govern-
ment also has an interest in providing important information to 
voters that will aid in their decision making processes. As Pro-
fessor McCubbins established, it is more difficult to cast correct 
votes on ballot measures than in candidate elections because of 
the comparative dearth of information: the most important and 
relevant cue—partisanship—is absent. Disclosing the identity 
of individuals or groups that fund ballot measure campaigns 
can, however, act as a substitute cue. Donations to campaigns 
are costly and hence are made by people who sincerely believe 
in the issue for which they are advocating. If voters can access 
information about a ballot measure’s supporters and oppo-
nents, they can treat those donations as endorsements and 
form their own opinions on the matter accordingly.  
Professor Kang notes that this form of campaign regulation 
has traditionally been relatively uncontested and noncontro-
versial. Reports of harassment surrounding California’s Propo-
sition 8 campaign, however, have catapulted disclosure laws in-
to the limelight. Opponents of disclosure laws argue that they 
generate a risk of targeted harassment—a fear made more pal-
pable in the age of ubiquitous Internet access and open infor-
mation—and as such will chill political participation. Professor 
Kang acknowledges that there are real and serious concerns 
surrounding the use of disclosure laws but argues that legisla-
tures, and not the courts, are the more competent and appro-
priate branch to determine how to strike a proper balance be-
tween the informational benefits of disclosure and the risks of 
harassment and chilled speech. 
Professor Todd Donovan of Western Washington Universi-
ty concluded the panel by presenting research on the collateral 
effects of ballot measure campaigns. Of the many differences 
between ballot and candidate campaigns, one important differ-
ence is that the former is focused solely on issues. This differ-
ence becomes especially relevant when the issue at question 
deals with the rights of a particular group within society. Pro-
fessor Donovan argues that campaigns advocating for ballot 
measures that ban same-sex marriage can be as much about 
society’s views of gay people as they are about substantive poli-
cy issues. He uses examples from campaign literature and 
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commercials to show that campaigns directly or, as is increas-
ingly the case, implicitly frame the issues in ways that ask vot-
ers to cast their ballots based on how they feel about the group 
being affected. Using survey data from before and after cam-
paigns on same-sex marriage, Professor Donovan shows that 
campaigns increase antipathy towards homosexuals, at least 
for people who were predisposed to feel such antipathy in the 
first place. Professor Donovan concluded by arguing that, even 
though our nation has become increasingly progressive on gay 
rights, direct democracy will continue to be used to demonize 
disfavored minority groups and we should therefore consider 
limiting the types of issues that ballot measures may address.  
During the lunch recess, Minnesota Secretary of State 
Mark Ritchie gave a presentation on the history of direct de-
mocracy in Minnesota. He traced the institution back to the 
founding of the Minnesota Constitution and raised concerns 
over ways in which it can and, to some extent, is designed to 
lock-in temporary political advantages through indelible consti-
tutional provisions. Drawing on historical examples, Secretary 
Ritchie also raised the important and troubling question of 
whether voters should be able to decide on each other’s funda-
mental rights. 
The final panel, “Direct Democracy’s Challenge: 
Majoritarianism and the Republic,” picked up where Secretary 
Ritchie left off by assessing the broader constitutional and phil-
osophical arguments for and against direct democracy. Taking 
much of what we learned from the previous two panels, Profes-
sor Shaun Bowler of UC Riverside, Judge Timothy Tymkovich 
of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, and Chief Judge Alex 
Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals assessed the ex-
tent to which direct democracy is consistent with the limita-
tions and purposes of our constitutional system of government. 
Judge Tymkovich questioned whether direct democracy is com-
patible with Article IV the U.S. Constitution. He noted that, 
depending upon how one defines a “Republican Form of Gov-
ernment,” direct democracy may be inconsistent with Article 
IV’s Guarantee Clause. Judge Tymkovich traced the purpose 
and use of the Clause back through history and assessed the 
probability that it could be used to challenge direct democracy 
as an institution given the Court’s current justiciability juris-
prudence. Although concluding that it is unlikely, Judge 
Tymkovich argues that it is possible that the Guarantee Clause 
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could be used to rule that a state constitution that allows for 
direct democracy is unconstitutional.  
Professor Bowler responded to criticism of direct democra-
cy by arguing that many of the attacks levied against direct 
democracy could be used to discredit representative democracy 
as well. For example, he suggested that laws passed by either 
process may be sub-optimal and that voters struggle to cast ac-
curate votes for both ballot measures and for candidates. If the 
problems with direct democracy are shared by representative 
democracy, Professor Bowler asks, how can we justify limits on 
the former that would not apply to the latter? What critics of 
direct democracy need is a critique or a limiting principle that 
uniquely applies to direct democracy. Professor Bowler sug-
gests that the notion of sovereignty can be used to restrain the 
excess of direct democracy in a fashion that is logically and 
philosophically consistent with limits that we place on repre-
sentative democracy. If the will of the people is sovereign in a 
constitutional democracy, then voters should not be able to bind 
or burden future generations with laws and policies that are 
not equally binding on the present generation. It should take as 
many voters to pass a constitutional amendment, for example, 
as it would to revise or repeal that amendment. This principle 
of sovereignty would not necessarily prevent many problems 
associated with direct democracy, but it would ensure an effec-
tive mechanism to correct them through the democratic pro-
cess.  
Chief Judge Kozinski concluded the panel and the sympo-
sium by discussing his own experiences in dealing with direct 
democracy both as a voter and as a judge. He acknowledged the 
many failings of direct democracy as an institution but cau-
tioned that we should not be too quick to assign to judges the 
task of fixing the institution or its output. Chief Judge Kozinski 
argued that, as a nation, we should place more faith in the vot-
ing public to make the right choices and trust in the democratic 
process to produce the best outcomes in the long run. 
The Minnesota Law Review’s 2012 symposium discussed 
the implications of direct democracy from the individual choices 
voters make at the polls to the decisions judges make within 
their chambers to the laws passed by legislatures at the capital. 
Many of the questions raised by the panelists in their talks and 
in their articles are fundamental to larger debates over democ-
racy and the rule of law. In a system governed by laws, are 
some rights so fundamental that they should be removed from 
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the democratic process? How should we pursue our desire to 
improve the democratic process so as to make it more efficient 
and democratic without trampling on the rights of citizens to 
participate and express themselves? And what role should the 
courts play in this system? Too often we assess the decision to 
enact law through direct democracy as a question of political 
expediency and as a part of our political theater. Instead, we 
should be taking a more thorough approach to analyzing direct 
democracy, one that focuses on the type of legal, practical, and 
philosophical questions addressed by the authors in this issue. 
It is our hope and belief that their work will help foster a pro-
ductive discussion on direct democracy that recognizes the pro-
found consequences and opportunities that it presents to our 
constitutional democracy. 
